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Abstract
Having gained momentum from its concept of decoupling the traffic control from the underlying
traffic transmission, Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a new networking paradigm that
is progressing rapidly addressing some of the long-standing challenges in computer networks.
Since they are valuable and crucial for networking, SDN architectures are subject to be widely
deployed and are expected to have the greatest impact in the near future. The emergence
of SDN architectures raises a set of fundamental questions about how to guarantee their cor-
rectness. Although their goal is to simplify the management of networks, the challenge is that
the SDN software architecture itself is a complex and multi-component system which is failure-
prone. Therefore, assuring the correct functional behaviour of such architectures and related
SDN components is a task of paramount importance, yet, decidedly challenging.
How to achieve this task, however, has only been intensively investigated using formal ver-
ification, with little attention paid to model based testing methods. Furthermore, the relevance
of models and the efficiency of model based testing have been demonstrated for software en-
gineering and particularly for network protocols. Thus, the creation of efficient and reusable
model based testing approaches becomes an important stage before the deployment of virtual
networks and related components. The problem addressed in this thesis relates to the use
of formal models for guaranteeing the correct functional behaviour of SDN architectures and
their corresponding components. Formal and effective test generation approaches are in the
primary focus of the thesis. In addition, automation of the test process is targeted as it can
considerably cut the efforts and cost of testing.
The main contributions of the thesis relates to model based techniques for deriving high
quality test suites. Firstly, a method relying on graph enumeration is proposed for the functional
testing of SDN architectures. Secondly, amethod based on logic circuit is developed for testing
the forwarding functionality of an SDN switch. Further on, the latter method is extended to test
an application of an SDN controller. Additionally, a technique based on an extended finite state
machine is introduced for testing the switch-to-controller communication. As the quality of a
test suite is usually measured by its fault coverage, the proposed testing methods introduce
different fault models and seek for test suites with guaranteed fault coverage that can be stated
as sufficient conditions for a test suite completeness / exhaustiveness.
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Résumé en français
Les réseaux logiciels (connus sous l’appellation : Software Defined Networking, SDN), qui
s’appuient sur le paradigme de séparation du plan de contrôle et du plan d’acheminement, ont
fortement progressé ces dernières années pour permettre la programmabilité des réseaux et
faciliter leur gestion. Reconnu aujourd’hui comme des architectures logicielles pilotées par des
applications, offrant plus de programmabilité, de flexibilité et de simplification des infrastruc-
tures, les réseaux logiciels sont de plus en plus largement adoptés et graduellement déployés
par l’ensemble des fournisseurs. Néanmoins, l’émergence de ce type d’architectures pose un
ensemble de questions fondamentales sur la manière de garantir leur correct fonctionnement.
L’architecture logicielle SDN est elle-même un système complexe à plusieurs composants vul-
nérables aux erreurs. Il est essentiel d’en assurer le bon fonctionnement avant déploiement
et intégration dans les infrastructures.
Dans la littérature, la manière de réaliser cette tâche n’a été étudiée de manière appro-
fondie qu’à l’aide de vérification formelle. Les méthodes de tests s’appuyant sur des modèles
n’ont guère retenu l’attention de la communauté scientifique bien que leur pertinence et l’ef-
ficacité des tests associés ont été largement démontrés dans le domaine du développement
logiciel. La création d’approches de test efficaces et réutilisables basées sur des modèles
nous semble une approche appropriée avant tout déploiement de réseaux virtuels et de leurs
composants. Le problème abordé dans cette thèse concerne l’utilisation de modèles formels
pour garantir un comportement fonctionnel correct des architectures SDN ainsi que de leurs
composants. Des approches formelles, structurées et efficaces de génération de tests sont
les principales contributions de la thèse. En outre, l’automatisation du processus de test est
mise en relief car elle peut en réduire considérablement les efforts et le coût.
La première contribution consiste en une méthode reposant sur l’énumération de graphes
et qui vise le test fonctionnel des architectures SDN. En second lieu, une méthode basée sur
un circuit logique est développée pour tester la fonctionnalité de transmission d’un commu-
tateur SDN. Plus loin, cette dernière méthode est étendue pour tester une application d’un
contrôleur SDN. De plus, une technique basée sur une machine à états finis étendus est in-
troduite pour tester la communication commutateur-contrôleur.
Comme la qualité d’une suite de tests est généralement mesurée par sa couverture de
fautes, les méthodes de test proposées introduisent différents modèles de fautes et génèrent
des suites de tests avec une couverture de fautes guarantie.
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1.1 Motivation
Computer networks and Internet structure usually consist of different network devices such
as routers, switches and different types of middle-boxes. For managing and configuring such
network devices, a set of specific and predefined command lines based on embedded oper-
ating system is usually used. Thus, traditional networks are essentially hardware-based and
suffer from significant shortcomings regarding research and innovations, reliability, flexibility
and manageability. For example, it can be argued that managing a large number of network
devices is a big challenge and is prone to many errors. The emergence of new technologies,
such as cloud and virtualization, generated the need for networks with higher accessibility and
dynamic management. For solving the problems and limitations of traditional networks, the
concept of Software Defined Networking (SDN), that separates control and data planes, was
introduced along with an associated interaction protocol between the two planes known as
OpenFlow (OF) [102]. OF is an emerging standard for SDN that ensures a clear separation
of the data and control planes and provides central programmable control and management
of the network using an SDN controller. Although SDN and OpenFlow started as academic
experiments [102], they gradually gained the approval of the IT and telecommunications indus-
tries that have since adopted and started using and integrating the SDN paradigm into their
cloud and network infrastructures.
The emerging field of SDN has enabled network deployment and service upgrade on soft-
ware time scales which has huge benefits in the network domain. This is because in the future,
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the network operators will not compete on the basis of network coverage alone but on the ba-
sis of features and services. The initial impact of SDN was seen in the datacenters. As early
as 2012, Google had their full scaled datacenter running as an SDN based architecture. SDN
is now all set to integrate the wireless domain too. With SDN, network administrators can
adopt many new technologies and applications rapidly on hardware-independent network ar-
chitectures regardless of multiple vendor-dependent protocols. The architecture involves SDN
controller(s) residing in the control plane while the forwarding element(s) (switches) and hosts
make the data plane. The SDN architecture allows end-users (e.g., network administrators,
operators, etc.) to specify requested paths (e.g., network policies, services) that should be
implemented as routes or simply implemented paths followed by traffic in the data plane.
Consequently, the impact of SDN on the networking domain will be enormous. Kreutz et al.
[84] conclude that SDN is established as a key technology in the future of networking systems.
Although SDN goal is to simplify the management of networks, several challenges arise.
Firstly, the software SDN architecture itself is a complex multi-component system, operating in
heterogeneous and failure-prone environments. Additionally, the requirements defining these
architectures and their related components are also complex and evolving. Therefore, it be-
comes of the highest priority to further raise the quality of such architectures and components
before their wide deployment.
SDN architectures and their components are built on software and as a result, unlike tra-
ditional networking systems, they have become increasingly sophisticated. Such large and
complex software more likely contain bugs that may disrupt the network functioning and cor-
rupt its operation. A recent study on the hazards in SDN-based Google network architectures
[57] reported that software bugs contributed to more than 33% of the high impact failures
documented in postmortem reports, which they attribute mainly to a high speed of network
evolution, and the need to keep up with the growing user traffic and demand for new features
and services. Another large-scale study by Microsoft [94] on root causes of end-users im-
pacting incidents in their production networks reports similar results. It shows that software
bugs contributed to 36% of critical outages, being major problem, way ahead of hardware fail-
ures and human errors. To summarize, in terms of virtualized networking systems, increased
complexity and higher customer expectations of quality impose thorough testing before any
deployment. Indeed, the software nature of such complex networks makes them error prone,
so the process of defect detection plays a crucial role. The typical testing process applied
to SDN is nonetheless human-intensive and is as such usually unproductive and often inade-
quately realized. More importantly, this testing process does not provide any assurance about
the quality of the tests. Research on test techniques that guarantee the fault coverage is there-
fore essential and required to foster the adoption and deployment of SDN based solutions and
systems.
The requirements that must be fulfilled by the SDN architectures and their components are
extremely complex and evolving very fast with the support of open source developments and
communities. For example, in the OF protocol requirements [113], just the flow entries instal-
lation command (Flow_Mod) is more than two pages long [113]. Thus, these requirements
can be subject to ambiguities. Further on, these requirements are expressed in informal lan-
guages which can cause different interpretations by developers. Therefore, all of these factors
would contribute to increasingly higher likelihood of implementations exhibiting diverging be-
haviours from their requirements. Consequently, informal reasoning does not lead to proving
the correctness of such architectures/components. Under these circumstances, the introduc-
tion of formal testing techniques in SDN domain becomes necessary and obvious and is the
focus of this thesis work.
Although, a number of valuable efforts in the context of formal verification and testing SDN
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architectures and their components already exist (see Chapter 3), there is still a lot of space to
improve the situation. In fact, prior research focusing on assuring the correctness/consistency
of SDN architectures/components has resulted in techniques that belong either to verification
or testing. The techniques of the former can ensure the respect of a given policy in the data
plane and can help checking configuration errors and problematic controller programs in the
control plane. Yet, as they check whether amodel of the SDN architecture/component satisfies
a given set of properties, they can only guarantee that the properties hold for the model and
hence some implementation faults can still escape this check as no test cases are applied
to the implementations. The techniques of the latter alleviate this challenge by targeting the
implementation under test (IUT). However, they are either performed for checking the paths
/ networks implemented in the data plane rather than checking the functionality of a given
critical SDN component, or they do not provide any guarantee about the test effectiveness.
This brings to the picture model based testing methods where test generation is based on
the model of a system under test (SUT). This line of work in the context of SDN in particular
has not matured yet. Not only the proposed approaches are rare but also they mostly focus
on testing the correct packets pipeline processing when it comes to testing the data plane for
example rather than assuring the correct functioning of the switch as an integral component
of the SDN architecture.
In summary, we feel or contend that model based testing is one of the most convenient
testing method which helps in detecting errors and bugs and can assure the proper functioning
of SDN architectures and their components. Indeed, model based testing allows the creation
of consistent, reusable, and well-documented models on the one hand and the derivation of
test cases with guaranteed fault coverage on the other hand. This is an important stage in the
testing process of SDN.
1.2 Problem Statement / Research Questions
The goal of this thesis is to check that the implementations of an SDN architecture and cor-
responding components conform to their requirements. Due to their phenomenal success,
SDN implementations are becoming increasingly complex, with such features as accepting
complex inputs (end-user requests), packets processing and interaction with a logically cen-
tralized controller. In the quest for conformance, the task of guaranteeing their correctness is
becoming ever more challenging. Further on, it is not unusual that an entire SDN architecture
might exhibit a behaviour such that the requests are correctly implemented in the underlying
data plane while the SDN components of such architecture (e.g., switch, controller) are not
implemented and/or operating correctly (hidden bugs).
The main research issue this thesis is concerned with, relates to assuring the compliance
of Software Defined Networking architectures and their components with respect to their spec-
ifications by means of model based testing.
The first critical challenge is to guarantee the consistency between the high level requested
paths and the configurations’ implementations of these requests in the data plane. In other
words, given an SDN architecture as the system under test, i.e., the SDN controller translat-
ing end-user requested paths into flow rules and the SDN switches implementing these flow
rules in the data plane to correctly forward traffic to hosts, what inputs should be applied to
the controller and what outputs should be observed at the data plane level such that conclu-
sions about the correctness of the whole architecture can be drawn, i.e., whether the SDN
architecture is functioning as expected/desired.
Resolving this first challenge will increase the confidence in reliable SDN architectures
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deployment without which trust in their implementations and operation can not be established
or built.
However, resolving the first challenge does not guarantee the correctness of the SDN com-
ponents forming the architecture. Moreover, should a bug be discovered by testing the entire
architecture, it certainly becomes of interest to localize its cause (possible root cause) or re-
sponsible SDN components. Indeed, the functional correct behaviour of SDN components
should not be taken for granted. Therefore, a second critical challenge that needs to be ad-
dressed concerns guaranteeing the correct behaviour of crucial SDN components, particularly
the switch and the controller.
The switch exposes two interfaces, one to perform packet processing in the data plane
and the second to communicate with a controller that instructs it how to process these pack-
ets. Therefore, two major challenges arise. Firstly, given the switch specified as a set of
configurations to forward packets in the data plane, how the correctness of its forwarding func-
tionality can be guaranteed. Secondly, given the switch in its communication with the controller
as the system under test. The SUT takes as input OF messages from the controller and out-
puts replies to the controller as specified by the OF requirements. The correctness of such
interaction needs to be assured.
The controller in an SDN architecture is also a core SDN component responsible for mak-
ing decisions on managing switches in the underlying data plane. Therefore, ascertain the
correct implementation of the controller is crucial. To this end, it is important to guarantee the
correct behaviour of its modules / applications. One critical module considered in this work is
the one responsible for translating end-users requests, specifying two devices between which
a link should be implemented, to corresponding configurations. The SUT in this case has a
one-direction communication with a given application from which it receives a request. It has
also a one-direction communication with a given switch in the data plane. The challenge is
to guarantee that the controller module under investigation assigns correctly the ports of the
network devices as specified by the request.
Based on the previous analysis, we focus on the following arising research questions:
1. RQ1 How to assure the correct behaviour of SDN architectures?
2. RQ2 How to assure the correct forwarding behaviour of an SDN-enabled switch in the
data plane ?
3. RQ3 How to assure the correct behaviour of an SDN switch in its interaction and inter-
facing with a controller?
4. RQ4 How to assure the correct behaviour of the module/application of an SDN con-
troller responsible for translating, for a given switch in the data plane, requests into
corresponding ports of the switch of interest?
To tackle these questions and challenges, in the upcoming section, the structure of this
work will be related to the solutions proposed by this thesis for addressing each key question.
This thesis develops novel testing techniques for guaranteeing the correct behaviour of
SDN architectures and their components. The techniques combine model based testing and
mutation analysis. The proposed approaches allow testing the actual implementations rather
than checking some network properties by means of formal verification as done by most of
the state of the art.
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To address the aforestated research questions, we opt for model based testing because it
systematically generates from themodel a collection of tests (test suites) that, when run against
the SUT, will provide sufficient confidence that it behaves as the model predicted it would. The
difference between model based testing methods and verification methods (massively used in
the state of the art; Chapter 3) is basically about the stimulation of the system under test vs.
the checking of the model. Now, the complexity of SDN architectures and related components
is not low, which results in verification methods being hard to apply to such systems. Model
based testing on the other hand scales much better and has been used to test large systems.
Although model based testing requires more up-front effort in building the model, it offers
substantial advantages over traditional software testing methods. Firstly, once a model is
built, it is easier to generate and re-generate test cases than it is with hand-generated test
cases. Besides, the quality of the generated test cases is high in comparison to other testing
techniques. This helps in detecting subtle errors. Indeed, model based testing techniques
strive to automatically generate test cases that are able to reveal whether any modelled fault
has been implemented. As a result, these techniques guarantee a fault coverage of the model
and are able, and have shown, to produce high quality test suites.
The result of this thesis can be divided into four main facets and contributions:
1. Model based approach for testing the functional behaviour of entire SDN archi-
tectures;
2. Model based approach for testing the forwarding functionality of the switch as a
critical SDN component;
3. Model based approach for testing the switch in its interaction with the controller;
4. Model based approach for testing a module/application of the controller. Specif-
ically, the controller application responsible for translating requested paths into
pairs of ports of a given switch.
The thesis is organized as follows. This chapter gives an overview and motivation of the
research topics of this thesis. It introduces the problems that the work is dealing with, its
objectives, contributions and structure.
Next, Chapter 2 has a foundation nature and includes the background on Software De-
fined Networking architectures and their components and interfaces, verification and testing
concepts, model based testing, mutation analysis and black and white box testing approaches.
Additionally, while introducing these foundations and concepts, we point out which chapter(s)
they are used in and how they relate to the thesis work.
Chapter 3 examines the related work on verification and testing techniques with respect to
SDN architectures and their components. For that purpose, a taxonomy is provided. Herewith,
a link to the current chapter is done. The literature investigation has elicited a set of limitations
and concerns and a set of research directions that the work of this thesis follows. The observed
lack of model based testing techniques applied to SDN in the current literature and ensuing
analysis, has led to the model oriented testing methodologies adopted and proposed in this
thesis.
The four following chapters relate to these proposed testing approaches.
Chapter 4 characterizes a novel model based technique for testing entire SDN architec-
tures taking into account potential interoperability issues in the controller-to-switch commu-
nication. The technique aims to ensure that requests expressed by end-users are correctly
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implemented in the data plane. The approach relies on graph/path enumeration. The chapter
relates to the first challenge of answering the question of how to guarantee the correct func-
tioning of such architectures. In particular, a fault model is introduced where the fault domain
contains potential implementations of virtual paths requested by an end-user. Afterwards, ap-
proaches for test generation under black box and white box testing assumptions are proposed.
To guarantee the fault coverage, the conditions are proven such that when under both testing
assumptions, a complete test suite with respect to such fault model can be derived. Addition-
ally, Chapter 4 provides an experimental evaluation of the proposed approach. A discussion
on the obtained results is then given so as to support the effectiveness of the presented testing
method. Results show that the derived test suites were able to detect a number of functional
inconsistencies in the considered SDN architectures.
Now that we have provided a novel testing technique guaranteeing to check for the cor-
rectness of the entire SDN architecture, the question that automatically arises is how about
the correctness of its components. Further ahead, one might want to identify which exact
component is not working as expected. This is addressed in detail in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
In particular, the second part of the thesis proposes novel model based techniques for
testing critical SDN components. At first, the thesis looks at testing the switch as a crucial
component of SDN architectures in two aspects, then a module of the controller is considered.
The forwarding functionality of the switch modelled and analyzed as a ‘stateless’ system
without considering its interaction with the controller is investigated in Chapter 5. For this
purpose, the chapter proposes a logic circuit based testing approach. An appropriate fault
model is introduced and a logic synthesis algorithm is presented. Some mutation operators
over the derived switch specification are introduced, then logic circuit based approach and
related SAT solving are utilized for detecting equivalent mutants. Further on, both active and
passive testing strategies are explored. Finally, the chapter demonstrates the effectiveness
of the approach using experimental evaluation. The results show for example that test suites
derived based on traditional logic circuit fault models have a high fault coverage for SDN-
enabled switch faults. This piece of work relates to the second challenge.
Despite the effectiveness potential of the solution presented in Chapter 5 in detecting im-
plementation forwarding errors, it does not cover the behaviour of the switch in its interaction
with the controller. This is tackled in Chapter 6. The chapter proposes an extended finite state
machine based test generation strategy for testing the functional behaviour of a switch in its
communication with an SDN controller with respect to requirements described in the Open-
Flow specification. A part of the requirements is formalized, then based on the derived model,
an appropriate fault model is introduced and a test generation method for deriving exhaustive
test suites with respect to such fault model is presented. To demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed approach, an experimental evaluation is performed which aims at the assess-
ment of the derived test suites fault coverage on one hand and at the execution of the derived
tests against an OF implementation under test, on the other hand. The conducted evaluation
shows the effectiveness of the approach; besides, experiments reveal several implementation
faults and specification ambiguities when a switch implementation is tested. By that, the third
challenge is covered.
Chapter 7 utilizes the results of Chapter 5 and addresses the further question of the out-
lined challenges. Themodel based approach presented and discussed in Chapter 5 is adapted
and adjusted to tackle onemodule of the controller, particularly the one responsible for translat-
ing end-user requests into corresponding pairs of ports of a switch of interest. First, the prob-
lem is described. Then, the formalization of the specification, the test generation approach,
and the test execution strategy follow subsequently. This relates to the fourth challenge.
Chapter 8 completes this work with a summary and outlook. The proposed testing ap-
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proaches’ capabilities and limitations are reviewed, the general trends of the quality assurance
for SDN architectures and their components are recalled and influences of the contributions
of this thesis are outlined.
1.4 Dissertation Roadmap
In this section, the dependencies between chapters throughout this thesis are outlined.
The detailed discussion on SDN, verification and testing in Chapter 2 serves mostly as a
foundation for the considered topics.
Chapter 3 includes a review of the state of the art work on verification and testing tech-
niques for SDN architectures and SDN components yielding to the position of our contributions
in the field.
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 contain the central achievements of the presented work. Addition-
ally, the reader can refer to the summaries given at the end of each chapter, which provide the
essential overview of the subjects and results on their contents.
The concept of the Logic Circuit based approach which is presented in Chapter 5 is used
as the basis for Chapter 7.
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In this chapter, the fundamentals and basic background information, on which we base our
work of testing SDN architectures/components, are provided. Firstly, in Section 2.1, the SDN
paradigm concepts, architecture, and components are presented. The necessary theoretical
background on the terminology and semantic of verification and testing used in the thesis is
covered in Section 2.2. Armed with these basics, we dig deeper into notions related to model
based testing in Section 2.3 with a brief insight into how these concepts will be used in our
contributions. Further on, in Section 2.4, the concepts of mutation analysis are introduced. An
overview of the black andwhite box testing approaches in Section 2.5 completes the theoretical
basics.
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2.1 Software Defined Networking
In this section, we provide a general description of SDN and give an overview of the compo-
nents and interfaces.
SDN is an emerging networking paradigm that is now growing in usage and popularity, pro-
gressing rapidly and addressing some of the long-standing challenges in computer networking.
SDN platforms are subject to be widely used and deployed. Recently, they are deployed into
several core and data center networks. This paradigm brings a major concept, namely it de-
couples the data control of the network from the data transmission. It moves the control logic
into a logically centralized component called controller. In contrast to the traditional network
architectures, the separation of roles in an SDN architecture is the key to achieving flexibility
and to making it easier to introduce new concepts in networking. One can certainly observe
that the abstraction offered by the SDN architecture provides wider flexibility on developing and
implementing new network functionalities and simplifies the configuration and management
of modern networks suggesting the opportunity for more innovations.
2.1.1 Overview of the SDN Architecture and SDN Interfaces
The foundation of SDN is proposed by the standardization organization called Open Network
Foundation (ONF) [142]. In an SDN architecture, a logically centralized control function (the
controller) translates the applications’ requirements and applies control instructions over the
forwarding devices (the switches) in the data plane, while providing relevant information up
to the SDN applications [102]. The forwarding devices in the data plane then reroute data
packets to other forwarding devices and to hosts according to these control instructions [132],
[54], more specifically, forwarding and filtering rules [134].
An SDN architecture is composed of three layers, i.e., (i) the network applications, (ii) the
control plane composed of one or multiple controllers, and (iii) the data plane composed of
the forwarding devices and hosts [142]. The interaction between these layers is performed
through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). The SDN controller has mainly two APIs.
The southbound API responsible for collecting network status and updating forwarding rules
in the forwarding devices. The northbound API such as the ‘Representational State Transfer’
(REST) API handles interaction with the application layer, i.e., receiving requests/ policies de-
scribed in high level languages from SDN applications and providing a synchronized global
view. It enables direct expression of network behaviour and requirements. Northbound API
presents a programmable API to network control and management applications. The south-
bound API allows the exchange of control messages between the controller and the SDN
forwarding devices. This interface dictates the format of the exchanged control messages.
Multiple southbound interfaces exist such as OpenFlow (OF) [102], ForCES [44], and POF
[143]. The OpenFlow protocol is the most deployed SDN protocol as the southbound inter-
face [152]. Multiple OpenFlow protocol versions exist including versions 1.0, 1.3, 1.5. During
the thesis, we used the stable releases of OpenFlow at the time (versions 1.0 and 1.3). All OF
versions use the same structure of SDN rules, with some action and match field additions in
each version.
An example of an SDN architecture is depicted in Figure 2.1.
SDN network architectures allow end-user (e.g., a network administrator) requests/require-
ments representing network policies to be specified and implemented in the data plane. Net-
work applications can issue the requests on the shape of data paths that have to be imple-
mented between pairs of sources and destinations through the network architecture. The con-
troller then computes the appropriate flow rules and pushes them to the switches. A switch
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acts as a forwarding device receiving and sending network packets in accordance with the
configured rules. It also sends events such as traffic statistics, network changes and acknowl-
edgments to the controller. An end-user request might impose for example the traversal of a
given sequence of switches. An example of a request is ‘traffic from hosts in local area net-
work Subnet1 to the internet must traverse the switch S1 and one of the switches S6 and S7
(Figure 2.1).
In this thesis, we assume that the network architecture is functioning correctly if the network
policies (requests) defined by the network applications and translated by the controller are
correctly implemented by network devices in the data plane. In Chapter 4, we propose a
model based testing technique to guarantee such correctness.
In the following, we detail the layers of the SDN architecture.
Figure 2.1 – SDN layered architecture.
2.1.2 Application Layer
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the application layer resides above the control layer. Through the
northbound API, SDN applications can conveniently access a global network view and can
implement different strategies to configure the underlying physical infrastructure (data plane)
using a high level language. The application layer mainly consists of the end-user network
applications or functions that consume the SDN network services. Examples of such applica-
tions include network visualization, load balancing and firewalls applications. Based on the
network configuration requirements and specific needs, a network administrator can program
new network applications (new network functionalities) in standard programming languages.
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2.1.3 Control Plane
The control layer bridges the application layer and the data plane. It consists of a set of
software based SDN controllers providing a consolidated control functionality through open
APIs [59]. This layer supervises the network forwarding behaviour.
The controller sets up all forwarding devices in the data plane, maintains topology informa-
tion, and monitors the overall status of the entire architecture [102]. It updates the flow table
by adding and removing rules using protocols such as OpenFlow [102]. Each forwarding de-
vice has a set of flow tables with rules. A rule has three parts: the matching condition to a
specific flow; the action to be applied to this flow, and counter to track the rule occurrence for
management purposes.
The Controller presents two behaviours, namely reactive and proactive. In the reactive
mode, the first packet of flow received by a forwarding element triggers the controller to insert
rules in each forwarding element of the data plane. In fact, the controller listens to switches
passively and configures routes on-demand (by installing the corresponding rules). It receives
messages of connected hosts from the switches. Upon receiving a Packet_In message from
the switch, the controller looks for the destination host location and sets the path by sending
Flow_Mod messages to affected switches in the path. In the proactive mode, the controller
pre-populates the flow tables in each forwarding element.
All functions of the control plane are performed by the controller. It has full network topology
information and the location of hosts. When a forwarding element receives a packet for which
there is no matching rule in its flow tables, it forwards it (using Packet_In) to the controller
asking for the action to take upon this new flow. The controller can define the port that the
flow must be forwarded to or take other actions, such as dropping the packet. The controller
must set the entire path by sending Flow_Mod messages to all switches from the source to
the destination.
The SDN controller allows the applications to communicate with the SDN forwarding de-
vices, and creates the global view of the network. The controller is also able to monitor all
the network forwarding elements regularly. It then informs the network applications of the net-
work changes using the northbound interface. Then, the network applications manage and
implement policies in the network devices using the northbound interface.
Throughout the thesis, we consider architectures with controllers’ deployments logically
representing a single controller. However, the proposed approaches can easily be extended
with an architecture with multiple controllers.
2.1.4 Data Plane
The data plane consists of forwarding devices and hosts. The forwarding devices include
physical and virtual switches which are interconnected between each other and with hosts.
An example of an SDN switch is the software OpenvSwitch (OVS) [121].
The Switch
A switch exposes two interfaces allowing its interaction with packets in the data plane on one
hand (forwarding functionality) and its interaction with the controller on the other hand. A
switch does not have any built intelligence and relies on the controller to give it a set of rules
to know how to treat/forward incoming packets. These rules are then saved in the switch flow
tables [113]. When a packet arrives to the forwarding device, it is matched against rules in
the flow tables. The action is triggered if the matching is satisfied and then, the counter is
updated. If the packet does not match any entry in the flow tables, it is sent to the controller
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over a secure channel to ask for an action. Packets are matched against all rules based on
some prioritization scheme. The flow table could have a priority field associated with each
rule. Higher number indicates that the rule should be processed before.
An SDN forwarding rule (also called a flow entry) is composed of three parts [113]
• Matching fields: packet header values to match the incoming packets in addition to the
input port. We refer to the matching fields as matching parameters.
• Actions: set of instructions to apply to the matching packet such as forward to specific
output port, flood, drop, send to controller or modify packet headers.
• Locations / priorities: to control the rule hierarchy.
The Switch in its Data Plane Interface (Forwarding Functionality) The forwarding rules
are grouped in different flow tables and are considered to be the configurations of switches
with respect to packets and application flow management.
As an example of rules installed in a switch, consider the set of rules defined in Table 2.1.
The table includes the following matching parameters:
• Flow Table, a virtual partition for the installed rules;
• Priority, the order attributed to the rule to be applied with respect to other rules in the
flow table;
• Input Port (In_port), the ingress port of the incoming packets;
• Ethernet Type (Eth_type), the type of traffic carried by the Ethernet datagram;
• Source and Destination IP Addresses respectively (IP_source, IP_dest), define the IP
protocol source and destination addresses;
• Output ports (Output) defines the set of ports to which a matching packet should be
forwarded.
Flow Table Priority In_port Eth_type IP_source IP_dest Output
0 500 ∗ ARP (0x806) ∗ ∗ Port 1
0 500 1 ARP (0x806) ∗ ∗ “All”
1 501 1 IP (0x800) 10.0.0.1/32 10.0.0.2/32 Port 2
1 501 2 IP (0x800) 10.0.0.2/32 10.0.0.1/32 Port 1
Table 2.1 – Example of rules installed in a switch
For example, the third rule in Table 2.1 is specified in the flow table 1 with the priority 501.
When the packets having the source IP address 10.0.0.1 and destination IP address 10.0.0.2
arrive to Port 1 of the switch, these packets have to be forwarded through the (output) Port 2
of the switch.
Chapter 5 answers the question of how to guarantee the forwarding functionality of a switch
specified as a set of configurations in the data plane.
The Switch in its Southbound Interface
The OF specification [113] describes the behaviour of the switch and its communication
with the controller. It specifies OF messages handling via the southbound API. Examples
of messages received/sent by the switch include ofpt_hello message for connection estab-
lishment; ofpt_feature for advertising the supported capabilities; flow_mod for handling
modification of rules in the switch; ofpt_barrier to get the information about when a given
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command is applied; ofpt_multipart for reporting statistics and ofpt_echo for sensing the
liveness.
Before any messages can be exchanged, the connection establishment process takes
place implying OF version and capability negotiation. Both ends of the connection exchange
hello messages immediately after the lower layer (TCP/TLS) connection establishment. Af-
terwards, to be aware of the capabilities of the switch, feature is exchanged. In case this
message is not received by the controller and after a timeout, the latter disconnects the switch.
Once the connection is successfully established, different messages can be exchanged, e.g.,
echo, flow_mod, barrier and multipart. The actions of rules installed by the Flow_Mod
messages are defined by the OF requirements and include for example modification of ip and
vlan values.
If an OF implementation complies with the requirements, the exchange of these messages
should be performed correctly with the specified parameters. In Chapter 6, a model based
approach is proposed to test the switch in its communication with the controller.
2.2 Verification and Testing
It is necessary to evaluate or judge the ‘correctness’ of an SDN architecture and its related
SDN components, i.e., whether the SDN architetcure/component meets its requirements and
specifications and whether it fulfills its intended purpose.
In the following subsections, basic concepts related to verification and testing employed
throughout the thesis are briefly introduced.
2.2.1 Verification
Verification is a process that involves mathematical proof showing that a system satisfies a set
of desired properties. Formally, given a system M , verification aims at the creation of a set
of properties P that are iteratively checked during phases of development of M to determine
whether or not the behaviour of M meets the set of properties P [32, 46].
In the context of SDN, the network verification problem can be formulated as follows. Given
an abstract model of an SDN component(s) (or a composition of those) Model(N) and a set
of network properties P expressed in a given logic formulae, determine whether Model(N)
satisfies P.
We distinguish the different verification methods applied to SDN based on the mathemat-
ical formalism used in the reasoning process during the verification. In this work, under ver-
ification we understand a process that does not require any stimulation of the system under
verification.
Examples of network properties (referred to as invariants as well) to be verified include:
• Reachability [43] is concerned with whether the network always successfully delivers
packets to the intended end hosts. A definition of reachability property can be for ex-
ample that a packet pkt can get from the source host Host1 to the end host Host6 in
Figure 2.1.
• Forwarding Loop [97] occurs if the same packet returns to a location that it has visited
before. There are several possible definitions of this property, e.g., returning to the same
location with exactly the same header, or returning to the same location with a possibly
different header. The former case indicates the presence of an infinite loop, since this
packet will repeatedly return to this location. The latter case may also be undesirable
since there is usually no reason for a packet to return to the same location.
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• Black-holes [141] means that packets are dropped because there is no destination con-
figured on one of the forwarding devices they traverse.
2.2.2 Testing
In software development methods, testing occupies a central position of ensuring software
quality. In order to judge the correctness of a system under test, one should observe or moni-
tor for each test execution what the system does, how it does it, and perhaps when it does it.
Active testing is defined when a system under test (SUT) is stimulated by appropriate inputs,
i.e., test sequences / cases, and the conclusion about its correctness is made based on the
observations of its output responses. Testing techniques applied to SDN architectures/com-
ponent (s) are based on stimulating the architecture/component(s) (or composition of those)
under test by test cases and observing their reactions with the intent of finding errors. Passive
testing is defined when one just monitors the SUT and observes that the behaviour is correct
or incorrect without stimulating the SUT. Debugging / troubleshooting is defined as stimulating
the SUT by appropriate inputs and observing its reactions in the objective of localizing errors
[10], [107].
Random testing [10] generates test cases in a (uniformly) randomway with negligible effort.
A more evolved form, referred to herewith as ‘semi-random’ consists of ‘controlling’ the way
random test cases are generated. For example, starting with randomly generated inputs and
repeatedly modifying them, more or less at random, to produce new inputs. This increases
the probability of inputs found in this way being ‘interesting’.
2.3 Model Based Testing
Model based testing has received increasing attention due to its ability to improve produc-
tivity, by automating test planning, generation, and execution. In model based testing, test
cases/sequences forming a test suite are generated from an abstract model, which captures
the desired behaviour of the system. Then, the test cases/sequences are executed against a
real implementation of the system and the conformance of the implementation to the specifi-
cation is checked by comparing the observed outputs with the ones specified by the model,
for some suitable definition of conformance. The specification can be a formal model of the
system and might also be defined by a set of (end-user) requirements that should be correctly
implemented.
The central artifact of model based testing is the model. It serves as an abstraction of
the system under test (SUT), manageable by the test engineers. In this context, the primary
idea behind a model based method is the benefit of deriving a specification for a system that
might cover its functional behaviour. The model/specification may be utilized as the basis for
automating parts of the testing process and can lead to the generation of more efficient and
effective test cases/sequences.
A large number of possibilities is present with respect to how to model the SUT. For ex-
ample logic circuits or state based models such as Finite State Machines, Extended Finite
State Machines, Input/Output Transition Systems, etc., might be considered. For state based
models, most notations for test modeling are based on states and their identification.
In the following subsections, we provide a glance insight into preparatory ingredients for
the author contributions. In subsection 2.3.1, we give an introductory overview of a formal
representation of an SDN architecture that supports our first contribution in Chapter 4. In
subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, we introduce logic circuit and extended finite state machine as
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models that we use in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively to support the proposed test generation
techniques. In subsection 2.3.4, definitions related to the notion of fault models are provided.
2.3.1 Formal Representation of an SDN Architecture
SDN architectures satisfy end-user requests/requirements by forwarding data in a given data
plane. At the level of a switch in the data plane, forwarding decisions are defined by rules.
To implement desired requirements during forwarding, network administrators/operators de-
fine requests to be implemented in the data plane. For instance, they impose some policies
to be applied to the flows. The ‘specification’ in this case is defined by a set of (end-user)
requirements that should be correctly implemented.
In the thesis, unless the context is explicitly indicated, we refer to the data plane as the
Resource Network Connectivity Topology (RNCT 1) for which a formal definition is given in
Chapter 4. An RNCT depicts the SDN components in the resource connectivity network. An
informal description of a path in an RNCT is depicted in Definition 2.1. Amore formal definition
is provided in Chapter 4.
Figure 2.1 presents an example of a network topology consisting of one controller, seven
switches and six hosts. Each switch is connected to the SDN controller. S1 is connected to
hosts Host1 and Host2, S4 is connected to Host3 and Host4, S6 is connected to Host5 and
S7 is connected to Host6.
Definition 2.1.
A path in an RNCT between two given hosts is a sequence of network devices that starts
and ends with hosts and all other intermediary devices are switches.
Based on the topology of Figure. 2.1, the corresponding RNCT and some examples of
its paths are illustrated in Figure. 2.2. In this example, the RNCT is a network with seven
switches and six hosts.
Host1 S1 S2 S3 S4
S5S6S7
Host2 Host3
Host4
Host5Host6
RNCT
Host2 S1 S2
S6Host5
Path1
Host3 S4 S3
S2
S6S7Host6
Path2
Host6 S7 S6
S5S4Host4
Path3
Figure 2.2 – RNCT of the network topology in Figure 2.1 and examples of its paths
The presence of potential errors/bugs in the SDN architecture certainly breaks the intended
1Hosting infrastructures can be physical or virtualized.
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network functions. The errors might be due to the inconsistencies between end-users’ (e.g.,
network administrators) logical requests and the actual flow-level implementations. Figure 2.1
shows a misbehaviour of an SDN architecture consisting in implementing a different request
(marked in red in the data plane) than the desired/specified one (marked in green). Chapter 4
tackles this problematic and proposes a model based testing approach aiming to the detection
of such misbehaviours.
2.3.2 Logic Circuit
The specification of a system can be represented by a logic circuit as the underlying model in
model based testing. We propose this model for the testing approach developed in Chapter 5.
A sequential logic circuit consists of combinational logic and memory elements, namely
latches. A combinational circuit is composed of logic gates (AND, OR, etc.); each logic gate
implements a Boolean function. Unlike sequential logic circuits whose outputs are dependant
on both their present inputs and their previous output, which gives them memory, i.e., state,
the outputs of combinational logic circuits are only determined by the logic function of their
current input, logic vectors of ‘0’ or ‘1’, at any given instant in time. Thus a combinational
circuit is memoryless.
Definition 2.2.
A logic circuit, representing the system specification, is said to be Complete (or completely
specified) if the output is defined for every possible input vector, otherwise, it is said to be
Partial.
There are different formats of logic circuit representation. In this work, we consider the
Berkley Logic Interchange Format (BLIF) [18]. In this format, a combinational circuit is de-
scribed by the corresponding look-up table (LUT ). An LUT contains a set of input/output
Boolean vectors describing the circuit’s behaviour. The LUT table of the partial specification,
portrayed in Figure 2.3, is shown in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.4 shows an example of the BLIF file for the logic circuit of Figure 2.3. The names
of external inputs and outputs are listed in the file. Then, following those declarations, the truth
tables for each of the gates with their inputs and outputs are listed. For example, element n6
is a function of two arguments x0 and x2.
A logic circuit can be modelled as an AND-INVERTER Graph (AIG). In fact, a Boolean
network is a directed acyclic graph with nodes representing logic gates and directed edges
representing wires connecting the gates. AIG is a combinational Boolean network composed
of two-input AND-gates and inverters [106]. In an AIG, each node has at most two incoming
edges. A node with no incoming edges is a primary input. Primary outputs are represented
using special output nodes. Each internal node in the AIG represents a two-input AND func-
tion.
Example
Figure 2.3 illustrates an example of a partial specification (logic circuit) designed as an AIG.
2.3.3 Extended Finite State Machine
A state based model is one of the most powerful ways to represent a system Sys where a
number of stimuli (inputs) is received by Sys and actions (outputs) are produced by Sys. For
example, the specification of a system can be represented by a state based model such as
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8
7 11
6 10 9
z0 z1
12
x2 x0 x1
Figure 2.3 – An example of a
partial logic circuit specification
designed as an AIG (cex)
x0, x1, x2 z0, z1
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0
Table 2.2 – The look-up
table (LUT) of the
specification cex illustrated
in Figure 2.3
. model cirex
. inputs x0 x1 x2
. outputs z0 z1
. names x0 x2 n6
10 1
. names x2 n6 n7
00 1
. names x1 n7 z0
10 1
. names x0 x2 n9
11 1
. names x0 x2 n10
00 1
. names n9 n10 n11
00 1
. names x1 n11 z1
10 1
. end
Figure 2.4 – A BLIF
description of Cex
shown in Figure 2.3
Finite State Machine (FSM) or Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) as the underlying model
while testing.
These models are used to describe behaviours of sequential systems where outputs de-
pend on inputs and the current state. This is to be opposed to combinational behaviours where
the output is only dependent on the set of inputs as described earlier with combinational logic
circuits in Subsection 2.3.2.
In this context, classical FSM for example can be used. An FSM is a transition system
with a finite number of inputs, outputs, states and transitions each labeled by an input/output
pair [48]. FSMs are widely used in various application domains, such as modeling and testing
communication protocols, and other reactive systems.
States, transitions, inputs, and outputs are the building blocks of an FSM. The collection
of states represents all the possible situations in which the FSM may be. The model goes
through a sequence of transitions to reach a certain state. A state is some kind of a memory
that represents the current state of the model. From a software point of view, a state can
be a set of specific values for a collection of variables. A transition is an allowable two-state
sequence that results in an output and must specify a starting state and a final state (of the
transition). A transition usually means a change in the value for state variables. An input
triggers a transition.
Definition 2.3.
Formally, an FSM [48] is a quintuple (S, I,O, hS,Sin), where
• S is a finite set of states with the set Sin ⊆ S of initial states;
• I is a finite non-empty set of inputs;
• O is a finite non-empty set of outputs;
• hS ⊆ S× I ×O×S is a transition or behaviour relation, where a 4-tuple (s, i,o, s
′) ∈ hS is
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a transition.
If |Sin | = 1, then the machine is initialized, otherwise it is non-initialized. In this work, we
consider initialized machines.
In spite of their good expressiveness, FSMs are not powerful enough to model in a suc-
cinct way practical systems. For example, systems which contain variables and where their
operations depend on the variable values. The EFSMmodel extends the classical FSMmodel
with input and output parameters, context variables, update functions and predicates defined
over context variables and input parameters. It is more adequate to model complex reactive
systems.
The contribution of Chapter 6 proposes an EFSM to model the switch-to-controller commu-
nication and investigates the problem of deriving input test sequences based on such model.
In the remaining of this subsection, we give formal definitions related to EFSM and a simple
illustrative example.
Let X andY be finite sets of inputs and outputs; INp, OUTp and Cv be finite disjoint sets of
input/output parameters and context variables respectively. Some inputs (outputs) are related
to subsets of parameters. For x ∈ X , let INpx ⊆ INp be the set of input parameters of x and let
DINpx be the set of input vectors, each component of an input vector corresponds to an input
parameter associated with x. The set of output parameters and vectors are similarly defined.
Let DCv be the set of context vectors v. Given an input x and a (possibly empty) set of input
vectors, a parameterized input is a tuple (x,px) where px is an input parameter vector. A
sequence of parameterized inputs is called a parameterized input sequence. Parameterized
outputs and their sequences are defined similarly.
Definition 2.4.
An EFSM [118] S over X,Y , INpx , OUTpy, Cv, DINpx , DOUTpy and DCv is a pair (S,T)
of a finite set of states S and a finite set of transitions T between states in S, such that each
transition t ∈ T is a tuple t = (s, x,P,op, y,up, s′), where
• s, s′ ∈ S are the initial and final states of the transition, respectively;
• x ∈ X is the input of the transition;
• y ∈ Y is the output of the transition;
• P, op and up are functions, defined over input parameters and context variables
– P : DINpx ×DCv → {True,False} is the predicate of the transition;
– op : DINpx ×DCv → DOUTpy is the output parameter function of the transition;
– up : DINpx ×DCv → Cv is the context update function of the transition.
If a transition t has a predicate, the latter must be satisfied in order for t to be enabled. A
configuration of S is a pair (s,v).
Definition 2.5.
An EFSM S [118] is
• Deterministic if any two transitions outgoing from the same state with the same input
have mutually exclusive predicates;
• Complete if for each pair (s, x) ∈ S×X , there exists at least one transition at state s with
the input x, otherwise S is called partial;
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• Initially connected if each state of S is reachable from the initial state.
In this thesis, we consider deterministic, initialized, initially connected but not necessarily
complete EFSMs.
Example
We illustrate the notion of an EFSM and how it operates through a simple example. Consider
an EFSM given in Figure 2.5 which is defined over state set S = {State1,State2,State3}, inputs
a and b, i.e., X = {a,b}, where b is non-parameterized and a is parameterized with an integer
parameter k with value a.k, outputs 0 and 1, i.e., Y = {0,1}. The set of context variables is
Cv = {w}. In this example, we assume that DCv (domain of the variable w) is the set of all non-
negative integers. The set of input parameters is INp and we assume that the domain DINpa
(domain of the input parameter k) is the set of all non-negative integers, while DINpb =  as
b is non-parameterized. The EFSM of this example is deterministic, initialized (State1 is the
initial state), initially connected and partial.
For a parameterized input, for example a, let a(0) denote the fact that the EFSM receives
the input a with the parameter value a.k = 0. The machine has six transitions. For exam-
ple, it has t1 = (State1,a,1 ≤ a.k ≤ 5,−,0,w := w + 1,State2) with states State1 and State2
as start and final states, respectively, the predicate 1 ≤ a.k ≤ 5, and variable update func-
tion w := w+ 1. Assume that (State1,w = 0) is a current configuration of the EFSM and the
machine receives a parameterized input a(k), then the machine checks the predicates of out-
going transitions from State1 that are satisfied for the current configuration under the input a
with parameter value a.k. If the received value a.k = 3, then the machine checks predicate
1 ≤ a.k ≤ 5. As 1 ≤ a.k ≤ 5 holds, the transition t1 is executed according to the context up-
date function w := w+1 with output 0, and the machine moves from State1 to the final state
State2 as specified by t1. In fact, the machine moves from configuration (State1,w = 0) to
configuration (State2,w = 1).
State1start
State2 State3
t1
[1 <= a.k <= 5]
a(k)/0
w := w + 1
t2
[w = 0]
a(k)/0
t3
b/1
w := w+1
t4
[w , 0]
a(k)/1
w := w+1
t6
[a.k >= 6]
a(k)/1
w := w − 1
t5
b/1
w := 0
Figure 2.5 – Example of an EFSM
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2.3.4 Fault Models
As the quality of a test suite is usually measured by its fault coverage, i.e., the types and
number of faults that can be detected by the test suite, the proposed testing methods in this
thesis introduce different fault models and seek for test suites with guaranteed fault coverage
that can be stated as (necessary and) sufficient conditions [119] for a test suite exhaustiveness
/ completeness (Definition 2.6 below).
The main motivation for using fault models is to have tests which can detect, i.e., cover
certain types of implementation faults. Such tests offer a ‘guarantee’ for the test quality in
terms of fault coverage.
In a usual way, a fault model is defined as a tuple ⟨S,@,FD⟩ [120] where S is the specifi-
cation, @ is the conformance relation and FD is the fault domain. In general, the specification
is a formal model of the system, however, it might also be defined by a set of (end-user) re-
quirements that should be correctly implemented.
The relation @ defines the conformance of a given implementation I to the specification
S. If the specification is complete (completely specified) then the conformance relation can
be chosen to be equivalence and can be represented for example by the equality. If the
specification is partial, then the conformance relation can be represented for example by the
quasi-equivalence denoted as ≃. The fault domain FD is a set of implementations. In model
based testing, the specification model can be altered (mutated) in order to model a fault in the
implementation. FD can be defined to contain the resulting mutants. Checking that a mutant
from FD is not equivalent to the specification means to guarantee that the implementation
does not implement any of the incorrect behaviours. The conformance relation @ partitions
the set FD into conforming and nonconforming implementations (mutants).
As usual, an implementation I ∈ FD is called conforming if I@S; otherwise, I is a non-
conforming implementation. Given the specification S, a test case is a finite input sequence
of S. An implementation under test passes a test case/sequence if the output response of
the implementation to the test case/sequence is contained in the set of output responses of
the specification S to the test case; otherwise, the implementation under test fails the test
case. As usual, a test suite is a finite set of test cases. An implementation under test passes
(fails) a test suite if the implementation passes each test case (or fails some test case). If an
implementation fails a test suite then we say that the implementation can be detected with the
test suite.
Definition 2.6.
• A test suite TS is said to be exhaustive w.r.t. the fault model ⟨S,@,FD⟩ if each imple-
mentation I ∈ FD such that I @/S can be detected with TS.
• A test suite TS is said to be sound w.r.t. the fault model ⟨S,@,FD⟩ if each implemen-
tation I ∈ FD such that I@S passes TS.
• A test suite TS is said to be complete w.r.t. the fault model ⟨S,@,FD⟩ if TS is exhaus-
tive and sound.
2.4 Mutation Analysis
Mutation analysis is a powerful approach for both evaluating test suites’ effectiveness and sup-
porting test generation [111]. The principle idea is to inject ‘artificial’ faults, called mutations,
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into the code or the specification model yielding mutants. It allows to measure test effective-
ness based on the number of detected mutants. Researchers have proven that detecting
mutants results in finding real faults [74]. In particular, this has been shown as well for model
based mutation [3]. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that specification model mutants lead
to tests that are able to reveal implementation faults that were neither found by manual tests,
nor by industrial tools [3]. Moreover, model based mutation’s power is to identify faults related
to missing functionality and misinterpreted specifications.
In model based testing, mutants are introduced based on model transformation operators
that alter the specification. When the faults injected in the specification model to obtain corre-
sponding mutants are defined by a user such as an expert, a test engineer, etc.; the resulting
mutants are referred to as user-defined mutants. There are two kinds of mutants, first-order
mutants when the specification and the mutant models differ by a single model transformation,
and higher-order mutants, derived from the specification model after multiple transformations.
When a mutant is detected by a test sequence (case), it is said to be killed. Otherwise, it is
said to be survived. To measure the adequacy of testing and assess the fault coverage of test
suites, a standard metric called mutation score is used. It is defined as the ratio of mutants
killed by the test suite under assessment to the total number of unique mutants [10]. This ratio
gives an evaluation of the fault revealing power of a test suite [111]. To calculate the mutation
score, one has to execute the whole test suite against every selected mutant.
In the thesis, we make use of mutation analysis. In chapter 4, the fault coverage of the
derived test suites is evaluated based on a codemutation. In Chapters 5 and 6, the established
models are mutated in order to support test generation, and experimental evaluations based
on mutation score metric are conducted in both chapters in order to prove the effectiveness of
the proposed testing approaches.
2.5 Black Box and White Box Testing
In testing, the black box approach is a technique for test case generation where test cases/se-
quences are constructed according to information derived from the specification or require-
ments without requiring knowledge of the internals of the system. In other words, a system
under test (SUT) is treated as a black box, i.e., we do not have any knowledge about the inter-
nal structure of the SUT. Only information about what inputs does the SUT expect and what
are the specified outputs is available, without knowledge of how the SUT derives those results.
This means Black Box testers do not have access to the source code and are oblivious of the
SUT architecture. Note that the requirements might be user-defined. For example, in Chap-
ter 4, while making use of this approach, the test cases are constructed based on the requests
of an end user (a network administrator/operator).
A Black Box tester typically interacts with an SUT through interfaces by providing inputs
(points of control) and examining outputs (points of observation) without knowing where and
how the inputs were operated upon. In Black Box testing, the SUT is exercised over a range
of inputs and the outputs are observed for testing correctness.
White box testing refers to the technique of testing an SUT with knowledge of the internals
of the system. White box testers have access to the source code and are aware of the system
architecture. A white box tester typically analyzes source code, derives test cases from knowl-
edge about the source code, and finally targets specific code paths to achieve a certain level
of code coverage. A white box tester with access to details about the SUT can readily craft
efficient test cases that exercise specific parts of the SUT for example. This allows the tester
to examine for example parts of a system that are ‘suspicious’, rarely tested or pointed out as
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‘doubtful’ by an ‘expert’/‘knowledgeable’ user.
Black box and white box testing approaches both choose test cases that investigate a par-
ticular characteristic of the system, however in white box testing, test cases can be generated
to test some implementation specific aspects of the system.
2.6 Chapter Conclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to discuss the backgrounds of SDN architectures and their
components on one hand and the basics of testing related notions on the other hand. Herein,
the details on SDN, verification and testing, model based testing, mutation analysis, and black
and white box testing approaches have been presented.
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“Science arose from poetry. . .when times change the two can meet again on a higher
level as friends.”
– Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
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3.1 Introduction
The process of verification/testing of an SDNarchitecture/component involves checking whether
the latter behaves in the way it was designed to behave. In this thesis, formal approaches for
testing SDN architectures/components are proposed. With this in mind, the first step is to
investigate the literature works that have contributed to developing techniques for SDN verifi-
cation and testing. This chapter reviews this field of research. At first, the current introduction
refers the reader to other related surveys in the field. Afterwards, the state of the art solutions
are presented with emphasis on their mode of operation, what objective they have addressed
and what solutions they have proposed.
It is worth mentioning that the literature study in this chapter does not include SDN security
and fault tolerance works. Indeed security and fault tolerance can be considered as an aspect
of overall network correctness or lead to network errors. However, we believe their related
techniques need independent reasoning and examination.
The general principles of SDN have been covered in several surveys that appeared as
early as 2012, e.g., [110, 84, 69, 167, 5]. However, in these works, the verification and testing
techniques applied to SDN have been briefly overviewed. A layered description of existing
work in this area has been covered in [156]. In the same line, some tools for SDN testing and
debugging have been covered in [65], [107], [55], [127], [110], and [84]. A brief overview of
the challenges related to SDN correctness has been provided in [72]. An insight into various
mathematical tools and verification methods used in the analysis of SDN has been covered in
[56]. A brief introduction of the works on the same topic has been presented in [124]. To the
best of our knowledge, the topic area of verification and testing SDN architectures and their
components has so far only been covered in detail by one survey. Li et al. [92] recently have
focused on the application of formal verification and testing methods to both traditional and
SDN architectures.
We note that in the majority of the aforementioned efforts, SDN verification and testing
techniques have either been barely discussed as part of the challenges SDN brings or have
been a part of a more wide study about networking in general. In this chapter, we present a
comprehensive survey of the research relating to this topic that has been carried out to date.
We analyze and summarize different solutions and categorize them w.r.t. the techniques they
involve.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the first group
of existing solutions related to SDN verification. Section 3.3 is devoted to the group of existing
SDN testing techniques. Each of the aforementioned sections introduces the technique of
interest, investigates its application to SDN, illustrates it with an example and finally derives
some general conclusions. The Subsections 3.2.3 and 3.3.6 recapitulate the verification and
testing efforts and identify their limitations respectively. Finally, Section 3.4 summarizes the
analysis and concludes the chapter.
3.2 Verification Techniques for SDN
In this section, we summarize and classify existing SDN verification techniques. Subsequently,
we present two main categories namely Off-line and Run-time. To illustrate the underlying
mechanism behind a given technique, a simple example is usually provided based on the
network topology of Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1 – An example of an SDN network topology
3.2.1 Off-Line SDN Verification Techniques
These techniques are the most popular for checking the SDN correctness. They verify a fixed
configuration of the network by making the assumption that the forwarding behaviour remains
the same as far as the controller does not explicitly instruct new rules, update or remove rules in
the switch. In general, off-line verification techniques consider the global behaviour of the SDN
network topology as a snapshot of network state which they analyze and then the predefined
network properties are checked.
3.2.1.1 SAT Solving
SDN verification problem can be reduced to a satisfiability (SAT) problem and solved by SAT
solvers. SAT expresses the problem as Boolean expressions using propositional logic. The
interesting question here is: how does this technique reduce an SDN network verification
problem to a SAT one?
SAT solving has been applied to the data plane where in fact the forwarding rules in each
switch are represented by Boolean expressions. Next, the property to check (e.g., reachability)
is expressed a Boolean expression as well (see example). Note that usually a counterfactual
reasoning is used to enable a form of negation of a property in order to prove it holds. Once the
SDN verification problem is formulated using Boolean expressions, deciding the satisfiability of
such expressions, i.e., determining if there exists an assignment (or prove there does not exist)
of the Boolean variables that makes the expression logically True, allows to conclude whether
the property holds. This is done by feeding the resulting expression as input to a SAT solver. In
case the property is violated, a counterexample is returned. For example, to express the data
plane verification problem as a SAT one, the matching part of each rule can be encoded as a
Boolean expression in the following way. Consider the matching part of a given rule denoted
as (p1 ∈ V1 ∧ p2 ∈ V2 ∧ . . .∧ pn ∈ Vn) where p1, p2, . . ., pn refer to the variables representing
the packet fields (e.g., MAC address, IP address, port number) and V1,V2, . . .,Vn refer to the
intervals wherein these variables can take values. For example, dstip ∈ 10.1.3.0/24 means
that the IP destination address is in the subnet 10.1.3.0/24. This matching part is represented
by a Boolean expression expn = var1∧ var2∧ . . .∧ varn such that pi ∈ Vi is mapped to vari
that takes the value True if the value of pi is indeed in the interval Vi and False otherwise. The
expression expn, for a given assignment of truth values for the variables vari, results in one
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of the Boolean value True or False.
SAT solving technique has been first proposed by Mai et al. [97] who have shown how
network properties can be translated into SAT instances which are checked using a SAT solver
for detecting potential problems / issues in the data plane, in particular violations of properties
such as absence of routing loops and black-holes. The tool implementing this technique is
called Anteater. The experiments have shown that, for example for checking three standard
network invariants in a campus network, Anteater spends two hours. Then, McGeer [101] has
extended this idea to consider a network of OF switches as a network of Boolean expressions.
The network properties have been reduced to logic expressions over the variables of this
network. In the same line of applying this technique to the data plane, Zhang et al. [173] have
also formulated the verification problem as a SAT problem. Reachability and loops are the
properties checked in this work.
Example
Consider the network topology of Figure 3.1 and the SDN verification problem is to check
reachability between S1 and S3. This example is inspired by the paper of Mai et al. [97].
The matching part of each rule in each switch is encoded as a Boolean expression (in our
example, for simplicity, each Boolean expression includes one Boolean variable, indeed here
we use only the destination IP addresses). R12 of switch S1 that forwards packets to S2 is
represented as the Boolean expression exp = var1 where var1 is a Boolean variable that
represents dstip ∈ 10.1.3.0/24. All the other rules are encoded similarly.
• The Boolean expression that represents the forwarding between a host and a switch or
between a switch and a host is expHostiSi = expSiHosti = varHostiSi where varHostiSi is
a Boolean variable that represents dstip ∈ 0.0.0.0/24.
• The Boolean expression that represents the forwarding between two switches (e.g.,
S1 and S2) is expS1S2 = varS1S2 where varS1S2 is a Boolean variable that represents
dstip ∈ 10.1.2.0/24. The Boolean expressions that represent the forwarding between
S1 and S3, S2 and S1, S2 and S3, S3 and S1, S3 and S2 are encoded similarly.
The resulting Boolean expression that expresses one possible path from Host1 to Host3 is
then varHost1S1 ∧varS1S2 ∧varS2S3 ∧varS3Host3 , another path can be expressed by varHost1S1 ∧
varS1S3 ∧ varS3Host3 and consequently to check the reachability between Host1 to Host3, it
suffices to feed the Boolean expression depicted in Equation 3.1 to a SAT solver that will try
to find an assignment (if it exists) that makes Equation 3.1 evaluate to True.
expHost1Host3 =(varHost1S1 ∧ varS1S2 ∧ varS2S3 ∧ varS3Host3) ∨
(varHost1S1 ∧ varS1S3 ∧ varS3Host3)
(3.1)
In this simple example, the Boolean expression depicted in Equation 3.1 is satisfied, hence
the property holds.
SAT solving technique determines whether a Boolean formula expressing SDN components
and properties is satisfiable. It has mostly been applied to the data plane layer and has been
used in checking properties such as reachability and loops.
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3.2.1.2 Symbolic Execution and SMT Solvers
As any verification technique, symbolic execution [83, 21] checks whether certain properties
can be violated by the system. This is done by simultaneously exploring multiple paths that
the system could take under different inputs. The system can take symbolic (rather than con-
crete) input values. The execution is performed using a symbolic execution engine. For each
explored path, the engine maintains two important pieces of information: a logic formula that
describes the conditions satisfied by the branches taken along that path, and a symbolic vari-
able, say store that maps variables to symbolic expressions or values. The execution of a
‘branch’ updates the formula, while ‘assignments’ update the symbolic variable store. A sat-
isfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver is then used to verify whether there are any violations
of the property along each explored path and if the path is feasible, i.e., if its formula can be
satisfied by some assignment of concrete values. In the following, we investigate how such a
technique is applied to solve an SDN network verification problem.
In fact, symbolic execution technique models the forwarding behaviour of an SDN architec-
ture (or component) by describing the behaviour of each forwarding table (and hence rules).
The packet header fields (e.g., IP address, MAC address) are expressed symbolically where
each variable representing a field is symbolic, i.e., assigned a set of values that is specified by
an associated constraint. To symbolically execute the whole model, the symbolic engine fol-
lows multiple branches on each encountered rule. It exercises all possible paths and records
the constraints of the symbolic input on each path. The constraints define which values of the
input vector lead to this path. Then, the path constraints are solved using a constraint solver
determining if the property is violated. For example, when switch S1 of the network in Figure 3.1
receives a packet, it is handled according to its table. However because the packet fields do
not have a concrete value, no specific rule is applied to it, instead, the approach branches
out taking into account all possibilities of actions of S1. S1 has three rules, namely: R11 that
forwards packets to Host1, R12 that forwards packets to S2 and R13 that forwards packets to
S3. In this case four branches are considered; the first one is when R11 is applied, the second
is when R12 is applied, the third one is when R13 is applied and the last one is when S1 sends
Packet_Out message to the controller without applying any rule. Suppose that Host1 wants to
send a packet pkt to Host2, this can be expressed by dstip(pkt) == ip(Host2) (a). When pkt
arrives at S1, the expression from the applied rule in the first branch is dstip(pkt)== ip(Host1)
(b). Constraint solvers are used to solve these expressions along each path. In this example,
(a) and (b) are not satisfied simultaneously so the path that takes the first branch is not feasible.
This technique has first been introduced by Dobrescu et al. [43] where the pipeline pro-
cessing of a switch is modelled as a tree that consists of subtrees, one per table, and the
property to verify is crash-freedom. The model describing the behaviour of a switch is com-
posed of models describing the behaviour of each of its tables. A table model takes as input a
symbolic vector representing the fields of a network packet and outputs either the same vector
or a modified version of it, which in return is fed to the next table in the pipeline. A symbolic
vector is a vector of symbolic variables. Dobrescu et al. have extended this work in [42] where
they have addedmore properties to be checked. Panda et al. [114] have applied this approach
to the data plane as well. In their work, network properties such as reachability and isolation
have been expressed using formulae that imply constraints on data flow within the model, then,
the SMT solver Z3 [37] has been used to check if the specified properties hold. Wu et al. [153]
have followed the same approach to generate a model of the switch from its source code, the
resulting model can then be used to check a set of network properties. Yakuwa et al. [158]
have applied this approach to the SDN network modelled as a transition system and the SMT
solver Yices has been used to execute the paths and solve the constraints.
In the same line, Kazemian et al. [77] have proposed to simulate the network model using
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‘symbolic’ variables instead of concrete packet field values at the inputs of the network model
(the space of all possible packet headers localized at all possible input ports in the network
called ‘the network space’). The switches aremodelled as transfer functions whichmap header
head arriving on port port to (header,outputport). During this process, expressions based
on the initial symbolic variables and the functionality of each of the switches are derived. The
set of expressions represents implicitly the set of states that are reachable by the set of packets
with an appropriate set of inputs. Therefore, this allows the behaviour of the network (in a
specific state) to be verified with a single execution step, simultaneously under all possible
input packets. This process is called ‘Header Space Analysis’ (HSA). Now for a given property
such as reachability, HSA computes it from source Host1 to destination Hostn via switches
S1,S2, . . .,Sn−1 as follows. First, a header space region at Host1 is created representing the
set of all possible packets Host1 can send: a symbolic representation of packet fields. Next,
switch Si ’s transfer function is applied to the representation of the packet to generate a set of
regions at its output ports, which in turn are fed to Si+1’s switch transfer function. The process
continues until a subset of the flows that left Host1 reaches Hostn. Wang et al. [150] have
applied the HSA approach for checking SDN firewall applications.
Canini et al. [26, 25] have modelled an SDN controller event handler application as a
transition system. At each state, the system exposes a set of possible transitions, each of
which evolves the system from one state to another. To check the application correctness, the
approach checks after traversal of each transition that predefined network properties (specified
as Python code snippets, e.g., loops and black-holes) hold in the current state. To accomplish
this, the resulting transition basedmodel is subject to checking using symbolic execution where
the latter involves symbolic packets (defined as a group of symbolic integer variables that each
represents a header field). The algorithm that checks if the property holds in each state of
the model runs as follows. At any given state, each transition (modelling the event handler
application) is ‘symbolically’ executed. This allows the set of packets that exercise all code
paths in the event handler to be identified. For every feasible path, the symbolic execution
engine finds an equivalence class of packets that enable such a path. For each equivalence
class, one ‘concrete’ packet is chosen which will enable the next transition to the next state
of the controller application under verification. Therefore from each state, there are as many
transitions as the number of equivalence classes. In summary, while checking the properties,
the state space is exploded by ‘symbolically’ executing the transitions. Experimental results of
the work have shown that this approach (implemented as a tool called NICE) can be effective
only for relatively small networks due to potential state explosion.
Example
This example is motivated by Dobrescu et al. [43]. Let us suppose that the switch S1 of Fig-
ure 3.1 is composed of two tables T1 and T2. The models of these tables and their correspond-
ing trees are shown on the left part of Figure 3.2. The resulting tree is shown on the right side.
In the first step of the verification of S1, each table is verified individually. In the second step,
the table is checked as a part of the pipeline. The verification in the first step is done as follows.
Each table model is executed with symbolic input (Pkt in this example) and the segments that
may cause the property to be violated are marked as ‘suspect’. At the end of this step, a con-
straint and a symbolic variable store are obtained for every feasible segment, e.g., for seg1
the constraint is c1 = (Pkt < 0) and the symbolic variable store is sym1(Pkt) = Pktout ← 0,
for seg3, the constraint is c3(Pkt) = (Pkt < 0) and the symbolic store is sym3(Pkt) = crash.
Segment seg3 causes a crash, it is marked as suspect. The verification in the second step
is done as follows. Each path pi (a sequence of segments segi) that includes at least one
suspect segment is checked. In this case, the paths that include the suspect segment are p1
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and p4. The resulting constraint at p1 is cp1 = (c1(Pkt)∧c3(sym1(Pkt))) = (Pkt < 0)∧(0 < 0)
which is always False and thus p1 is not feasible, similarly for p4. However, all feasible paths
consist of non-suspect segments (never crash), therefore the property of crash-freedom holds
in switch S1.
Figure 3.2 – A symbolic execution encoding of the switch S1 of the topology in Figure 3.1
Example adapted from Dobrescu et al. [42]
Not only has symbolic execution technique been applied to the data plane layer but also
to the control plane (e.g., Canini et al. [26, 25]) and to the whole architecture as well (e.g.,
Yakuwa et al. [158]). Symbolic execution technique has been employed to check properties
such as reachability, absence of loops, black-holes and crash-freedom.
3.2.1.3 Model Checking Over Temporal Logic
Model checking over Temporal Logic is a verification technique that provides an algorithmic
means of determining whether an abstract model (representing, for example, a hardware or
software design) satisfies a formal specification expressed as a temporal logic formula. More-
over, if the property does not hold, the method identifies a counterexample execution that
shows the source of the problem [31]. In the following, we discuss how such technique is
adopted to solve an SDN verification problem.
In fact, the SDN architecture/component in this case is represented as a finite state model
and the properties to be verified (e.g., reachability, absence of black-holes, absence of loops,
OF rule consistency, etc.) as temporal logic formulae, then a checking if the properties hold
for the resulting model is performed. To illustrate this technique, let us use Computation Tree
Logic (CTL) to model an SDN architecture as a transition system where a state of the net-
work can be specified by the pair (pkt, switch) such that pkt denotes the packet and switch
denotes its location. The transitions between the different states can be specified by the
rules installed in each switch of the topology. For example, the CTL formula dstip(pkt) =
10.1.3.0&switch = S1 is satisfied by all packets with IP destination address 10.1.3.0 which
are located in the switch S1. The formula AF(pkt, switch = S3) states the formula (pkt,
switch = S3) holds at some points in the future. In this case, packets can always reach S3
from their current location. The formula (pkt, switch = S2) =⇒ AF(pkt, switch = S1) states
that all packets at switch S2 must eventually be forwarded to S1. The different rules in each
switch of the network as well as the property can be expressed using CTL in this way and
then be fed to a model checker. If the model violates the property, the model checker returns
a counterexample.
For checking the forwarding behaviour of a switch or the whole data plane, the rules have
been modelled as a state based system and the properties have been expressed either in LTL
as done by Peresini et al. [116] or in CTL as performed by Gutz et al. [61] and Al-Shaer et al.
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[136, 135]. Model checkers such as SPIN [67], JPF [149], SMV, and NuSMV [28] have been
used.
For checking the control plane, certain applications of the controller have been modelled
either as a finite transition system or a timed automata (TA) [9] as performed by Croft et al.
[34]. Properties have been expressed for example in LTL as done by Skowyra et al. [140],
or CTL as done by Kim et al. [82]. Also model checkers such as SPIN, NuSMV and Alloy
(Nelson et al. [108, 109]) have been used.
For checking the whole SDN architecture, different models have been proposed. A transi-
tion system has been adopted by Majumdar et al. [98] and Skowyra et al. [141]. Properties
such as reachability and black-holes have been expressed using LTL. For example, GΦ is a
formula where Φ is a formula over a set of atomic propositions and G is the operator of LTL
that means ‘globally’. Majumdar et al. have developed a model checker called ‘Kuai’ to solve
the verification problem. A network of finite timed automata (parallel composition of timed
automata) [8] has been used by both Kang et al. [76, 75] and Podymov et al. [123]. The
properties have been expressed using TCTL logic, i.e., CTL augmented which allows consid-
ering several possible future from a state of the system. VERSA [30] and UPPAAL have been
employed. Albert et al. [4] have encoded an SDN architecture into a specific language called
Abstract Behavioral Specification [73], then model checking has been used to check proper-
ties including rules consistency and absence of loops. Zakharov et al. [165] have proposed a
finite automata based model to capture the behaviour of an SDN architecture. The reachability
property has been specified using temporal logic. Shkarupylo et al. [139] have modelled an
SDN architecture using the Temporal Logic of Action (TLA) formalism [90]. The reachability
property has been verified. A TLAmodel checker has then been used in two different checking
modes namely breadth-first search (BFS) and depth-first search (DFS). Yuzhuang et al. [164]
have composed ‘already’ verified SDN components (separately) and have formulated the net-
work properties such as reachability and deadlock to verify them on the resulting model. The
result is subject to be verified by a model checker.
Example
We consider the network topology in Figure 3.1 and the property to check is reachability from
Host1 to Host3. We provide a simple example showing the reduction of the problem of the
verification of this topology into a model checking problem. The example is depicted by Equa-
tion 3.2 (using CTL). The initial state represents all possible packets are at host Host1. The
forwarding rules on switches moving packets between ports can be viewed as state transitions.
For example, the first formula states that all packets with IP destination address 10.1.2.0which
are located in the switch S1 must eventually be forwarded to S2. The model and property can
be input to a model checker (e.g., SMV). If the latter returns pass, the property holds on the
model. If themodel violates the property, a counterexample is returned. In this simple example,
the model satisfies the property.
(pkt,Host1) (Initial state)
(pkt,Host1) =⇒ (pkt,S1)
(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.2.0 & switch = S1) =⇒ AF(pkt, switch = S2)
(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0 & switch = S1) =⇒ AF(pkt, switch = S3)
(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.1.0 & switch = S2) =⇒ AF(pkt, switch = S1)
(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0 & switch = S2) =⇒ AF(pkt, switch = S3)
(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.1.0 & switch = S3) =⇒ AF(pkt, switch = S1)
(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.2.0 & switch = S3) =⇒ AF(pkt, switch = S2)
Can packets from Host1 reach Host3 ?
Check:
EF(pkt,S3)?
E means that ∃ at least one path starting from
the current state where the property holds.
F means that the property eventually has to
hold (somewhere on the subsequent path).
(3.2)
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Model checking technique has been applied to the data plane, control plane and the whole
architecture. A variety of properties including reachability, loops and black-holes have been
checked using such technique.
3.2.1.4 Deductive Verification and Theorem Provers
Similar to model checking, theorem proving technique expresses the properties to be verified
as logic formulae, then axioms and inference rules serve to derive new formulae from existing
ones. The technique checks whether the property is valid with the axiom and derivation rules
[36]. How this technique is applied to solve an SDN verification problem will be our main focus
in this subsection.
We provide a simple example of theorem proving encoding illustrating how this technique
can be applied to an SDN architecture/component in the example below.
A first group of works applies this technique to SDN by expressing both the SDN architec-
ture and the property to be checked using a set of formulae in a given logic. Then the relation
between these two entities is verified as a proof using a theorem prover. Ball et al. [14]
have modelled the controller events (e.g., the receipt of a packet from a switch) and switch
events (e.g., executing a rule and forwarding an incoming packet to a certain port (or dropping
it)) as well as desired properties using first-order logic, and then have implemented classical
Floyd-Hoare-Dijkstra deductive verification. The tool implementing their work is called VeriCon
[14]. Examples of properties include the absence of black-holes. Anderson et al. [11] have
described network applications as functions using packet histories. Then the Coq proof assis-
tant [15] has been used to prove their correctness. The checked properties are reachability
and traffic isolation. Attiogbe [12] has proposed an approach to build correct SDN components
from the refinement of a global formal model of an SDN architecture, using the decomposition
of the global model into the target components. The whole SDN architecture has been viewed
as a discrete event system and modelled using set theory. Then, Rodin [47] prover has been
used to establish model consistency. Examples of checked properties include ‘the data pack-
ets received by any switch are sent by the controller or by the other switches’. Rodin supports
LTL, and CTL for expressing properties with the standard modal and temporal operators.
For data plane verification, a similar approach has been developed by Chen et al. [27]. The
approach uses a declarative language to describe the OF functionalities. Network properties
such as reachability have been expressed using LTL and decomposed into global and local
properties. The verification steps include specifying the global and local properties, generating
lemmas for proving that local properties are satisfied given the global ones.
A second group of works employs theorem proving technique by developing ‘new releases’
of the SDN component to be verified. In this way, the SDN component under verification is
verified in advance ‘once and for all’ before deployment. For example, McGeer [100] has pro-
posed a new protocol (based on the OF protocol) that is proved. The author has demonstrated
formally the correctness of this protocol based on theorems and lemmas. In particular, he has
proven that only a single set of rules is present on a switch at any time. Guha, Reitblatt and
Foster [60] have also developed a verified SDN controller in the Coq proof assistant [15] and
have proven it correct against a formal specification and a detailed model of an SDN architec-
ture. Gordon Stewart [144] has built upon Guha et al. work by providing a suite of tools for
verifying properties that are input to Guha et al.’s verified controller.
Example
To illustrate an example of the theorem proving technique operating on the SDN topology
of Figure 3.1, we use the propositional logic to model the forwarding behaviour (motivated
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by Ball et al. [14]) and we prove that the reachability property from Host1 to Host3 holds
(Equation (u)). Let Si denote a switch, pik a port of Si (k is the number of ports in Si) and
Hosti a host. link(Si, pi j,Hosti) denotes that host Hosti is directly connected to switch Si
via port pi j . link(Si, pik, p j k,Sj) denotes that port pik of switch Si is directly connected to port
p j k of switch Sj . We propose to use reductio ad absurdum strategy for proving. Some of the
axioms are depicted as follows:
link(S1, p11,Host1) (a)
link(S2, p21,Host2) (b)
link(S3, p31,Host3) (c)
link(S1, p12, p22,S2) (d)
link(S2, p23, p32,S3) (e)
link(S1, p13, p33,S3) (f)
S1. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.1.0, p11)
(g)
S1. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.2.0, p12)
(h)
S1. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13)
(i)
S3. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.1.0, p31)
(m)
S3. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.2.0, p32)
(n)
S3. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p32)
(o)
link(S1, p13, p33,S3)∧ S1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13) =⇒ S3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p33)
(p)
link(S3, p31,Host3)∧ S3.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31) =⇒ Host3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)
(q)
link(Host1, p11,S1)∧Host1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11) =⇒ S1.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11)
(r)
S1.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11)∧ S1. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13) =⇒ S1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13)
(s)
S3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p33)∧ S3. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31) =⇒ S3.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)
(t)
(3.3)
In order to prove the formula in Equation (u), we prove the contrapositive, that is the formula
in Equation (v).
Host1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11) =⇒ Host3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)
(u)
¬Host3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31) =⇒ ¬Host1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11)
(v)
To perform such a proof, we use the resolution inference rule until either we can derive
Equation (v) or we cannot apply the inference rule anymore.
First the implications in Equations (p), (q), (r), (s), and (t) can be written as follows:
¬link(S1, p13, p33,S3)∨¬S1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13)∨ S3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p33)
(aa)
¬link(S3, p31,Host3)∨¬S3.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)∨Host3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)
(bb)
¬link(Host1, p11,S1)∨¬Host1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11)∨ S1.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11)
(cc)
¬S1.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11)∨¬S1. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13)∨ S1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13)
(dd)
¬S3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p33)∨¬S3. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)∨ S3.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)
(ee)
(3.4)
We can apply resolution inference rule to Equations (aa) and (f), and by resolving away
link(S1, p13, p33,S3) and ¬link(S1, p13, p33,S3), we get Equation (aaa).
¬S1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13)∨ S3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p33)
(aaa)
3.2. Verification Techniques for SDN 37
By applying also resolution inference rule to Equations (bb) and (c), we get Equation (bbb).
¬S3.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)∨Host3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)
(bbb)
Similarly for Equations (cc) and (a), we get Equation (ccc).
¬Host1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11)∨ S1.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p11)
(ccc)
Also the resolution rule applied to Equations (bbb) and (ee), we get Equation (ddd).
Host3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)∨¬S3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p33)∨
¬S3. f orwardTab(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)
(ddd)
Similarly for Equations (ddd) and (m), we get Equation (eee).
Host3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)∨¬S3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p33)
(eee)
And finally for Equations (eee) and (aaa), we get Equation (fff) which is equivalent to Equa-
tion (v) and thus the property is proven.
Host3.receive(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p31)∨¬S1.send(dstip(pkt) = 10.1.3.0, p13)
(fff)
Theorem proving technique has been applied to both the data plane and control plane
layers. It can be used in checking a variety of properties such as reachability and the absence
of black-holes. When applied to SDN, interactive theorem provers (e.g., Coq) that demand
explicit user guidance in the proof have been utilized.
The next section examines and categorizes some of the run-time verification methods that
have been applied to SDN architectures/components.
3.2.2 Run-Time SDN Verification
Run-time SDN verification seeks to verify the properties of the network in the presence of ar-
bitrary updates from the controller. That is when rules’ insertion, modification, and deletion
are performed by the controller and thus the network changes over time. The solutions devel-
oped to solve this issue either extend the off-line verification or rely on traversal of dependency
graphs modelling the SDN network topology.
3.2.2.1 Application of ‘Off-line SDN Verification Techniques’ Online
Several researchers have applied ‘Oﬄine SDN verification techniques’ presented earlier in
Subsection 3.2.1 and have added a solution to sketch the motion of the rules’ updates in
time in order to verify the properties guaranteeing that every packet traversing the network
is processed by exactly one consistent global network configuration/rule. Depending on the
proposed solutions to handle the updates, we classify the literature contributions using this
technique into three groups. The first group encloses the works proposing to revise the model
after each update and then apply off-line verification again. The second group encloses the
works proposing a modelling language that incorporate the dynamic of the updates. Finally,
the last group encompasses the works proposing the construction of a graph modelling the
network, the revision of this graph for each update and the application of one of the off-line
verification technique on the graph to check the property of interest.
In the first group, model checking and theorem proving techniques have been used to
check properties of static network configurations before and after the updates. To this end,
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a ‘monitor’ listens for incoming updates. Once a change happens, the model is updated ac-
cordingly and the off-line technique is run again over it. For example, Hussein et al. [71] have
used the model checker UPPAAL in this way to verify that no violations would occur, had the
rule update been installed in the switch. Examples of verified properties include loops and
the time delay for a controller to update a switch versus the switch to forward a packet. Sethi
et al. [133] have also used this method where a network model and the property have been
specified using propositional logic formulae. The model has been incrementally constructed
based on an abstraction that consists in focusing on the behaviour of the network in presence
of one packet and abstracting away all the rest. At a given time, all the packets (except one)
in the data plane are considered as the ones that trigger updates to the network state as they
are forwarded as events to the controller. Only one packet at a time is then to be forwarded in
the data plane. The switch table can then be abstracted to contain only rules about this packet
and only updates corresponding to these rules are incorporated in the model. Murphi model
checker [41] has been run over the resulting model. A combination of model checking and
theorem proving techniques has been used in this first group as well, as related in the work
by Reitblatt et al. [125]. In this case, a mathematical model that sketches the behaviour of
the SDN architecture has been formalized and proven in the Coq proof assistant. Then, prop-
erties such as loops have been expressed using CTL. To show that the model still satisfies
the desired properties after each update, NuSMV [28] model checker has been run over the
updated model.
The second group of works proposes to handle dynamic changes by adding semantics
to the used modelling language. This offers the ability to push new rules without modifying
the checking engine. After the model is established, symbolic execution/SMT for example, as
an off-line technique, can be applied. This has been done by Lopes et al. [95] where a given
language (Datalog) has been augmented to allow specifying network invariants and model the
forwarding behaviour of the changing network. Their solution has been implemented as an
extension of the SMT solver Z3 where a number of optimizations have been added. Another
work in this group has been proposed by Reitblatt et al. [126]. To guarantee that every packet
exclusively uses either the old rule or the new rule and not some combination of the two, an
abstraction mechanism has been incorporated in the modelling language, and then off-line
model checking has been applied. The main idea behind the abstraction consists in stamping
each packet with a version number at its ingress switch indicating which rule set should be
applied.
The third group of works suggests the construction of a graph modelling the network topol-
ogy, the revision of the graph upon a rule update, and the application for example of symbolic
execution/SMT by simulating the resulting graph over symbolic packets. This has been done
by Kazemian et al. [78] as an extension of their previous work on off-line symbolic execution
technique [77]. A ‘plumbing graph’ which captures all possible paths of packets through the
data plane has been constructed. Nodes in the graph correspond to the rules and directed
edges represent the next hop dependency of these rules. A rule is represented as a tuple
⟨match,action⟩. A rule R11 has a next hop dependency to rule R21 if (a) there is a physical
link from R11’s switch to rule R21’s switch; and (b) the domain of R21 has an intersection with
range of R11. The domain of a rule is the set of headers that match on the rule and the range
is the region created by the action transformation on the rule’s domain. A directed edge from
rule R11 to R22 has a filter which is the intersection of the range of R11 and the domain of
R22. When a flow passes through a directed edge, it is filtered by the corresponding filter. A
filter represents all packet headers at the output of R11 that can be processed by R22. In re-
sponse to an update, nodes are added/updated in the plumbing graph. The work by Shelly
et al. [138] also fits in this third group. They have built upon the work of kazemian et al. [78].
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The property to be checked is the capability of the controller to restore reachability in the pres-
ence of a link failure provided that the physical graph of the network is still connected. The
approach is based on computing failure scenarios (a scenario represents a set of links to fail
simultaneously) that maintain the reachability. For every link e, it checks if the network is still
connected without e, then, if yes, fails the physical link e and see if forwarding is still possible
between all nodes; if not, it reports the link failure. For this purpose, a monitor is interposed
in the southbound interface. It computes the failure scenarios and schedules them for execu-
tion while monitoring the network. After a failure scenario is executed, the verification engine
(simulation of the plumbing graph by symbolic packets [78]) verifies that the reachability still
holds.
Off-line verification techniques presented earlier have been applied to determine whether
the behaviour of the SDN architecture/component under verification satisfies the desired prop-
erties in the presence of updates. This approach has been applied to both data and control
planes. It has checked for example reachability, loops and rules’ consistency properties.
3.2.2.2 Dependency Graph Traversal
This technique reduces the SDN verification problem to the traversal of a ‘dependency’ graph
modelling the architecture/component. A dependency graph is a directed graph where vertices
may represent SDN components (e.g., switches) or rules in a switch, and edges represent
the dependency relation between these entities (components, rules). To capture the ‘live’
network activity, the dependency graph is constructed using a monitor placed between the
controller and the data plane. Two main solutions have been proposed depending on how this
graph is built. In the first solution, the graph is pre-built, then, after each update, the graph
is revised correspondingly, and the verification process is relaunched. The second solution
builds the dependency graph on the fly. We divide the works using this technique into two
groups correspondingly.
In the first group, Zeng et al. [170] for example have proposed a network policy checker
called ‘Libra’. To capture changes in the rules, the checker uses parallel processing to record
network event streams from the controller. A dependency graph has been constructed based
on all rules and recorded events. The nodes represent (local_switch,remote_switch) pairs
and the edges represent the forwarding relationship. Then a MapReduce [38] checker has
been used in order to check network properties based on the pre-built graph. In fact, Libra
partitions the graph into several sub-graphs corresponding to each subnet, then the properties
have been checked on those sub-graphs in parallel, using a graph library. Another example
of work in this first group has been related by El-Hassany et al. [64] where a happens-before
graph that captures the ordering of events (e.g., OF messages, packets) has been pre-built.
The violation of a property has been defined as the result of events concurrency (race) error.
Filters have been defined that can query the graph to check for properties violations. For
example, a ‘commutativity’ filter detects whether changing the order of two events affects the
network state. Example of a detected violation concerns races occurring when the controller
installs a set of rules and then sends a packet matching these rules without waiting for them
to be committed first. In the same line, Zhang et al. [175] have proposed a ‘Quantitative
ForwardingGraph’ (QFG) that represents how packets are forwarded. In aQFG, each node is
denoted as a tuple (H,D,S,G), representing any packet in the packet header space H arriving
at a network device D, when the network device is at a particular state S with performance G.
An edge pointing from one node to another means the modification of a packet. Whenever the
rules are updated, it is easier to find the affected QFG nodes as well as their dependencies,
thus, the verification can be limited to only those affected flows. To check reachability for
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example, a BFS is run on the QFG.Horn et al. [68] have constructed a directed edge-labelled
graph from the rules based on equivalence classes ECs of packets (EC are defined as the
set of packets that are treated the same across the data plane). The edges in this case are
labelled by the matching/action part of a rule. An insertion of a new rule for example results
in the creation of a new edge labelled with its matching part, and existing edges are updated
correspondingly. The verification of reachability is also performed by a traversal of the graph.
The second group of work constructs the dependency graph on the fly while the updates
are happening and checks if the property holds by a traversal of such graph. In this context,
khurshid et al. [80, 81] have used a multidimensional prefix tree (trie) structure from which
a dependency graph is generated each time an update from the controller is perceived. A
trie is an ordered tree that associates the set of packets matched by a rule with the rule itself.
Each level in the trie corresponds to a specific rule’s field. Each node has three branches
representing the possible values that the rule can match (0, 1, and * (wildcard)). The trie can
be seen as a composition of several sub-tries, each corresponding to a packet header field. A
path from the trie’s root to a leaf of one of the bottom most sub-tries thus represents the set of
packets that a rule matches. Each leaf stores the rules that match that set of packets, and the
devices at which they are located. When a new rule is to be inserted, a traversal of the trie is
performed to find all the rules that intersect it. These rules collectively define a set of packets
that could be affected by the incoming rule. This set will generate equivalent classes ECs of
packets. By traversing the trie for each EC, a dependency graph is generated where a node
represents an EC at a particular device, and a directed edge represents a forwarding decision
for a particular (EC, device) pair. To check reachability for example, a traversal of the resulting
dependency graph (e.g., using DFS) is effected. Yang et al. [159] have modelled each rule by
a predicate and an action. The variables of the predicate are packet header fields. The data
plane is modelled as a directed graph where nodes represent switches and each directed edge
represents the link from the output port of one switch to the input port of another. Each input
port is guarded by a list of rules predicates and each output port is guarded by the predicate
of the matching rule in that node followed by a list of rules predicates of the next node. Any
packet can pass through if a predicate is True. Reachability in presence of an update has
been checked by constructing a tree on the fly. The reachability tree from a given port to all
other ports is computed by performing a DFS on the graph . Beckett et al. [16] have extended
the work of Khurshid et al. [80, 81] to verify the network not only in the presence of updates
but also if the verification conditions change during the verification process, that is, when the
verification is suspended temporarily to add some changes and then is resumed. For example,
the programmer may want to suspend the verification temporarily to add a set of hosts to the
topology. Checking if the property holds in this case is performed using the same graph based
verification solution of [80, 81] augmented with the traversal of a new data structure, namely
a tree representation of regular expressions. In fact, the matching part of a rule as well as
the property to be checked are modelled as regular expressions describing the possible paths
that packets matching the condition may traverse. The regular expression formulae are then
represented as a tree. A node represents a ‘forall’ quantifier in the formula whose children
correspond to set elements, and whose result is the conjunction of the results of each of its
children. A leaf node represents a concrete property that is checked by the solution proposed
in [80, 81]. A truth value stored at each node represent the validity of the corresponding sub
formula. Afterwards, the result is propagated up to the parent of the node.
To capture the dynamic of rules updates, the technique based on dependency graph traver-
sal models an SDN network topology as a graph that is updated accordingly and the verification
problem is reduced to the traversal of such graph. The technique has been applied to the data
plane and can be used to check mainly reachability, loops and rules’ consistency properties.




















































































